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Labor Law
by Stephen W. Mooney*
and
Leigh Lawson Reeves*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the 1996 decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in which the court addressed issues in
the areas of traditional labor law. This Article specifically discusses
decisions by the Eleventh Circuit under the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA") 1 the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA"),2 the Occupational Safety and Hazard Act of 1970 ("OSHA"), 3
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").4
In this survey year, the Eleventh Circuit decided several cases
involving these traditional areas of labor law. Due to the volume of
cases, this Article does not attempt to address all the cases decided by
the Eleventh Circuit on these issues; rather, this Article attempts to
point out the more noteworthy decisions issued by the court in 1996 to
assist the general practitioner in the handling of these types of claims.
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29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994).

2. Id. §§ 209-219.
3. Id.§§ 651-678.
4. I& §§ 1001-1461.
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THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

A.

Jurisdiction
In InternationalUnion of Electronicsv. Statham,5 the Union filed suit
against three former Union officers who sold a piece of land that was
titled in their individual names. The Union alleged, among other things,
that the land had originally been improperly titled in the officers'
individual names and should have instead been titled in the Union's
name. Specifically, the Union sued the former officers, their lawyer, real
estate broker, and the buyer of the land, alleging that all parties had
breached their fiduciary duties to the Union members and the Union
itself. The Union filed suit in federal court on its own behalf asserting
claims for breach of fiduciary duties under section 501 of the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"), 6 as well
as breach of contract claims, pursuant to section 301 of the LMRA.'
The district court held that there was no jurisdiction under the LMRDA
section 501 or the LMRA section 301 and thus dismissed the suit by the
Union. The Union then appealed this decision to the Eleventh Circuit.'
1. LMRDA. The court began by interpreting sections 501(a) and (b)
of the LMRDA, recognizing that 'the procedural limits on an individual's
right to enforce the subsection (a) [fiduciary] duties, [were] analogous to
the demand prerequisites for bringing shareholder derivative suits. 9
Thus, for an individual to sue for breach of a union official's section
501(a) duty, he "must first request the union to proceed against the
official. Only if the union fails to act within a reasonable time after the
request may the individual proceed to federal court."'0 The court
inferred that because the union was given the "right of first refusal" to
a cause of action under section 501(b), Congress "preferred that the
union, rather than individual members, sue on its own behalf.""
Because this section contemplated a suit
brought by the union, it must
2
also contemplate federal jurisdiction.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

97 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1996).
See also 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1994).
See also id. § 185(a).
97 F.3d at 1417.
Id at 1419.
Id.

11.

Id.

12. Id
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The court next examined the legislative history behind the LMRDA
and found that it indicated a belief by Congress that state remedies for
union officials' breach of fiduciary duties were inadequate."3 Thus, the
court concluded that "Congress intended to supplement the remedies
available to unions by creating new federal protection."'4 Specifically,
the court stated "[itwould make no sense to impose federal duties and
simultaneously deny the unions the right to enforce those duties.""5
Based on this analysis, the Eleventh Circuit held that section 501(a)
"was intended to create a federal cause of action that can be asserted by
the union on its own behalf."' Because the court determined that a
federal cause of action existed in this case, it recognized federal
jurisdiction over the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331."
2. LMRA. The second issue addressed was the Union's contention
that section 301 of the LMRA also provided jurisdiction for its suit
against former Union officials. 8 Specifically, section 301(a) states that
the LMRA provides jurisdiction over contract suits "'between any labor
organization [representing employees in an industry affecting commerce].'" Consequently, defendants argued that section 301(a) did not
provide for contract suits between individuals within the labor
organization.' The Eleventh Circuit did not agree with defendant's
interpretation of section 301(a) and made special mention of several
cases they had affirmed in which the district courts asserted section
301(a) jurisdiction over individual defendants.2'
The Eleventh Circuit held, however, that section 301(a) would only
allow for jurisdiction over individual defendants as long as they were
seeking simply equitable relief.22 In addition, the court stated there
was no jurisdiction under section 301(a) for an action for damages. 23
In the present case, however, the Union had expressly limited its claim
to seek only equitable relief. Therefore, the court found there was
13.

Id. at 1420.

14.

Id.

15. Id.
16. Id. at 1421.
17. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)).
18. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)).
19. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)).
20. Id.
21. 97 F.3d at 1421 (citing International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Local Lodge Dll, 681
F. Supp. 1570, 1572 (S.D. Ga. 1987), aft'd, 858 F.2d 1559, 1560 n.1 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1047 (1989)).

22. Id. at 1422.
23. Id. (citing Building Material & Dump Truck Drivers v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500,502
(9th Cir. 1988)).
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federal jurisdiction over the Union's contract claim against its former
officers under the LMRA.24 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed
the district court's dismissal of this case and remanded the claim for
further proceedings.2"
B. Statute of Limitations/ Choice of Law
In International Union, United Plant Guard Worker's v. Johnson
Controls World Services, Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit faced a statute of
limitations issue. Because section 301 of the LMRA contained no statute
of limitations, the court had to determine if it should borrow one from
of the forum state or that of the state in which the claim
the law
27
arose.

The Eleventh Circuit started by reiterating the long-standing rule that
when Congress had not provided a limitations period for a federal claim,
a "'court must borrow the applicable limitations period in tolling rules
from the state in which it sits, unless those rules are inconsistent with
federal policy."' The court went on to note that in the former Fifth
Circuit, the case law sometimes borrowed the statute of limitations law
of the forum state and sometimes borrowed the statute of limitations law
of the state in which the cause of action arose.' Based on this conflict,
the court attempted to clarify the rule."0
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to the United States Supreme Court
case of Northstar Steel Co. v. Thomas. 1 In Northstar, the Supreme
Court did not literally discuss which choice of law should be used but
rather simply applied the law of the forum state.3 2 However, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that applying the law of the forum state
Even so, relying on the reasoning in
could "lead to forum shopping.'
Northstar,the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the statute of limitations
law in the forum state, Florida in the present case, must be applied to
this claim.

24. ld.
25. Id.
26.

100 F.3d 903 (11th Cir. 1996).

27.

Id. at 904.

28. Id. at 905 (citing Hawthorne v. Wells, 761 F.2d 1514, 1515 n.7 (11th Cir. 1985)
(emphasis added)).
29. Id. (citing Vigman v. Community Natl Bank & Trust Co., 635 F.2d 455, 459 (5th
Cir. 1981); Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d 685, 688 (6th Cir. 1967)).
30. Id. at 905-06.
31. 115 S. Ct. 1927 (1995).
32. Id. at 1930-31.
33. 100 F.3d at 906 (citing Northstar, 115 S. Ct. at 1931-32).
34. Id.
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The court then turned to the decision of exactly which statute of
limitations under current Florida law was most analogous to the present
claim.' The court reasoned that the suit in the present case was most
analogous to Florida's statute of limitations law for governing specific
performance of contracts.' Consequently, under this one-year limitation period, the Union suit was timely and the Union could proceed."7
C.

Jury Trial Under LMRA
In Stewart v. KHD Deutz of America Corp.,' the Eleventh Circuit
addressed two issues:
(1) whether [plaintiffs were] entitled to a jury trial on their breach of
collective bargaining claim under section 301 of the LMRA; and (2) if
so, whether [they] retain[ed] their Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial in a hybrid LMRA/ERISA action where the amount of monetary
relief sought under LMRA and ERISA [was] identical."
In this case, a class of retirees brought an action against their former
employer for its unilateral modification of their retirement benefits.'
The district court struck plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial, finding that
section 301 of the LMRA did not provide for one.4 '
In reversing the lower court, the Eleventh Circuit held that because
the LMRA did not provide a statutory right to a jury trial, its analysis
needed to focus on the Seventh Amendment. 4 The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial involves a two-part analysis. The first part
requires a comparison of "the nature of the issues to be resolved to
'[eighteenth century] actions brought in the courts of England prior to
the merger of the courts of law and equity.'"
The second part
determines "whether the remedy sought is legal or equitable in
nature.""
Initially, the court noted that although plaintiffs' action for breach of
the collective bargaining agreement did not exist at common law, it was
similar to the common law action for breach of contract. 45 In fact,

35. Id.
36. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 95.11(5Xa) (1982)).
37. Id.
38.

75 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1996).

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1525.
Id. at 1524.
Id.
Id. at 1525.
Id. (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987)).
Id. (quoting TuO, 481 U.S. at 418).
Id. at 1526.
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section 301 of the LMRA provided a cause of action for violation of
contract." Thus, the claims to be "resolved under the section 301
claim, when viewed in isolation of the ERISA claims, [were found to be]
legal in nature.' The court also found "no reason to depart from the
general rule that monetary relief sought pursuant to section 301 of the
LMRA [was] legal in nature."" Because both the issues involved and
the remedy sought under the LMRA were legal in nature, the court held
that plaintiffs had a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial under
section 301 of the LMRA.'
The court then had to determine whether the joinder of plaintiffs'
ERISA claim destroyed their right to a jury trial. The Eleventh Circuit
stated that for purposes of Seventh Amendment analysis, ERISA had
been interpreted as an equitable statute.'o Accordingly, no Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial would exist in actions brought pursuant
to ERISA. The court went on to note, however, that "section 514(d) of
ERISA explicitly save[d] federal causes of action, including section 301
of the LMRA."5 Moreover, because there was a policy, both in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in the spirit of the Seventh
Amendment itself, in favor of preserving the right to a jury trial, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the joining of plaintiffs' ERISA claim did not
defeat their right to a jury trial. 2
III. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
In Atenor v. D & S Farms,5 the Eleventh Circuit went to great
lengths to discuss exactly what factors determined a "jointemployment"
relationship and what guidance should be utilized in making such
determinations. Specifically, in Atenor, farm workers filed suit under
the FLSA and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection
Act ("AWPA)" 4 against the grower of certain farm products and the
contractor who had placed them in their jobs. Their complaint alleged
that the grower and the contractor failed to keep hourly records, pay
unemployment compensation and social security taxes, and pay wages
promptly when due. The farm workers also alleged that the growers

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
Blake
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994)).

Id.
Id. at 1527.
Id.
Id. (citing Chilton v. Savannah Foods & Indus., 814 F.2d 620,623 (11th Cir. 1987);
v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Id. at 1528 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1994)).

I
88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-72 (1994).
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"violated the AWPA by using labor contractors to recruit and transport
them without reasonably ensuring that the contractors were registered
and insured." 8 Moreover, the farm workers claimed that the grower
and contractor "violated the FLSA by failing to keep hourly records and
pay minimum wage.'
Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment on the grower's liability under both the FLSA and AWPA. The
farm workers argued that the growers were liable because they, along
with the contractor, "were joint employers' of the farm workers. 7 The
growers contended that they were not liable because the contractor "was
the sole employer of the farm workers." 8 The district court granted
summary judgment to the growers, finding that they were not employers
under either the FLSA or the AWPA5 9
The facts revealed that the grower actually hired the labor contracting
business to provide pickers. While the contractor was responsible for
"hiring, furnishing and paying the pickers," the grower still exerted some
control." For example, the pickers could not begin each morning until
the grower determined the morning dew had lifted from the beans. Also,
because the contractor could not afford to provide the pickers with
workers' compensation insurance, the grower withheld eleven cents from
the contractor's compensation for each box picked. This eleven cents was
used to purchase insurance that named the growers as the employer.
grower determined the hours and availability of work for the
Finally,6the
1
pickers.
In reversing the lower court's decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that
both statutes recognized joint employment in an attempt to prevent an
employer from getting workers through a contractor to avoid having to
comply with the statutes. 62 The court listed several factors that could
be used to determine joint employment status.' The factors to be
considered are:
(1) the nature and degree of the grower's control of the farmworkers;
(2) the degree of the grower's supervision, direct or indirect, of the
farmworkers' work; (3) the grower's right, directly or indirectly, to hire,

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

88 F.3d at 928.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 927-28.
Id. at 929.
Id. at 932.
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fire, or modify the farmworkers' employment conditions; (4) the
grower's power to determine the workers' pay rates or methods of
payment; (5) the grower's preparation of payroll and payment of the
workers' wages; (6) the grower's ownership of the facilities where the
work occurred; (7) the farmworkers' performance of a line-job integral
to the harvesting and production of salable vegetables; and (8) the'
grower's and labor contractor's relative investment in equipment and
facilities."

When applying these factors, the court noted that there were several
principals that should guide their determination. This guidance
included a warning that each employment relationship must be
examined independently.'
Also, "no one factor is determinative";
instead each factor must be used to determine if, on the whole, the
employee is economically dependent on the purported employer.'
Finally, the court warned that the determination of economic dependence
should not turn on "common-law concepts of employment.
In the present case, because the grower exerted control over the
pickers with respect to supervision, the "right to hire, fire, or modify
employment conditions" and the "preparation of payroll and payment of
wages", the court held it was a joint employer under both the FLSA and
the AWPA." This holding was further supported by the fact that the
grower owned the facilities where the work was performed and the
pickers performed a "line-job integral to business.'
IV.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADmINISTRATION

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Niemand Industries v. Reich,"'
dealt with a dispute surrounding an industrial hygiene inspection
performed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA"). The issue was whether OSHs evidence supported a
conclusion "that an employee engaged in [the employer's] talc operation
was exposed to talc in excess of the permissible exposure limit."7 '
The industrial hygienist sent to inspect the employer's facility
measured the exposure to talc in a method that did not comport with the

64. Id. (citing Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, Inc., 20 F.3d 434, 440-46 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 351 (1994)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 933.
68. Id. at 934-38.
69. Id. at 937.
70. 73 F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 1986).
71. Id. at 1084.
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one prescribed in 19 C.F.R. § 1910.1000(c)." The employer claimed the
measurements could not form the basis of an alleged violation of talc
Specifically, the employer contended that because the
exposure."
method used by OSHA in measuring the amount of talc in the environment did not "comport with the method" prescribed'in OSHA's own
regulations, those measurements could not form the basis of the alleged
violation.7 4 The industrial hygienist for OSHA, however, testified that
the technique he used was far superior to the old techniques outlined in
OSHA's regulations and, in fact, that the OSHA manual recommended
that his particular method be utilized in such calculations.75
Interestingly enough, however, the court held that even if the
technique recommended by the regulations was no longer viable, OSHA
must, pursuant to its rule-making authority, modify the regulations
before a new technique could be utilized.' Furthermore, the court held
that "absent substantial evidence that the results obtained exceed the
OSHA [limit], OSHA may not prosecute a violation on the basis of a
measurement technique not provided for in [their regulations].'"
V. THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURiTY ACT

As in years past, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA") was the subject of several Eleventh Circuit decisions.
Litigation in this area continues to be prevalent and as the following
cases demonstrate, practitioners need to be well-aware of the standards
and issues involved in ERISA claims to properly manage these type
cases. Due to space limitations, this Article will only address a few
cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit this past survey year.
A

Definition of Employer
In Tampa Bay International Terminals, Inc. v. Tampa Maritime
Ass'nh Tampa Bay International Terminals asserted in a letter to
Tampa Maritime that it was liable for withdrawal liability under section
3(5) of ERISA and demanded payment for such withdrawal liability.
Tampa Maritime then sought a declaratory judgment that it was not
subject to withdrawal liability, arguing that it was not an "employer"
within the meaning of ERISA, as amended by the Multiemployer
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id. at 1085.
I
73 F.3d 339 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 ("MPPAA). 7 At the district
court level, both Tampa Bay and Tampa Maritime moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Tampa Maritime finding that they were not an employer for purposes of
ERISA.
After the granting of summary judgment, Tampa Bay filed an appeal
to the Eleventh Circuit. Specifically, the question to be addressed by the
court was whether Tampa Maritime was an "employer" for purposes of
ERISA, as amended by the MPPAA.8 1 Tampa Bay argued on appeal
that because Tampa Maritime had some qualities and characteristics of
an employer as delineated under common law, they should be considered
an "employer" under ERISA and MPPAA. 2 The Eleventh Circuit
noted, however, that the definition of "employer" was a matter of federal
law and had already been specifically outlined in CarriersContainers
Counsel v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n.8
In CarriersContainers,the Eleventh Circuit adopted the "contributing
obligator" test for determining whether an entity was an "employer"
under ERISA. 4 Specifically, a "contributing obligator" is a party who
is obligated to contribute to a plan for the benefit of a plan's participant.M In order to be obligated, the Eleventh Circuit held that a party
must actually be contractually bound to make pension contributions to
a plan." In the present case, Tampa Maritime was in no way contractually bound to participate in the pension plan.' Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit found Tampa Maritime was not an "employer" for purposes of the
Act.M8
B. Preemption
In Morstein v. National Insurance Services, 9 plaintiff Margery
Morstein was the president, director, and sole shareholder of Graphic
Promotions, Inc. She was also one of two employees of Graphic. In
1991, she met with Scott Hankins, an insurance broker and employee of

79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1453 (Supp. 1995).

80. 73 F.3d at 340.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing 896 F.2d 1330, 1343 (11th Cir. 1990)).
84. 896 F.2d at 1343.
.85. 73 F.3d at 340.
86. Id. (citing Seaway Port Auth. v. Duluth-Superior ILA Marine Aas'n Restated
Pension Plan, 920 F.2d 503, 509 (8th Cir. 1990)).
87. Id.
88. Id

89. 74 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 1996), vacated, 81 F.3d 1031.
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the Shaw Agency, for the purpose of obtaining a replacement policy of
major medical insurance for herself and Graphics other employee. She
claimed that she told Hankins that any policy must not exclude from
coverage medical treatment related to any pre-existing medical
condition. Graphic purchased the policy proposed by Hankins. Over one
year later, National Insurance Services, which administered the policy,
refused to pay on a claim submitted by Morstein because it was for a
pre-existing condition. Morstein claimed that because Hankins and the
Shaw Agency fraudulently induced her to purchase a policy of major
medical insurance, she allowed a separate full-coverage policy to
lapse.'
Morstein then filed suit against National Insurance Services, Pan
American Life Insurance Company (the underwriter), the Shaw Agency,
and Scott Hankins in state court for negligence, malfeasance, misrepresentations, and breach of contract. Defendants removed the action to
federal court on the basis that Morstein's claims constituted an ERISA
action. Morstein moved to remand. The district court denied her motion
and entered summary judgment in favor of defendants as to the state
law claims against them. The district court concluded that Morstein's
claims "clearly relate[d] to the employee benefit plan established by
Graphic Promotions; therefore, those claims [were] preempted by
ERISA."9 ' Morstein appealed the district court's grant of summary
judgment.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that section 514(a) of ERISA?3
provided that its provisions "shall supersede any and all state laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to an employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) .... ."' In addition, a state law claim was
considered to "relate to" an employee benefit plan if the law had "a
connection with or reference to such a plan."9a The court then acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had endorsed a very broad
interpretation of the phrase "relate to" and had even extended preemption to certain state law tort claims, as well as contract claims brought
by employees.9

90.
91.
92.
93.

74 F.3d at 1136.
Id.

Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).

94. 74 F.3d at 1137 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (emphasis added)).
95. 1& (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) (citations

omitted)).
96. Id. (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987)).
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The Eleventh Circuit then looked to its earlier decision of Farlow v.
Union CentralLife InsuranceCo.,' and found that the current facts of
this claim were quite similar to the Farlow case. Specifically, in Farlow,
the plaintiff was a shareholder, president, and member of the board of
directors and his wife was designated as a beneficiary under his
company's benefit plan. The Farlows alleged that an insurance agent
induced them to purchase a new group health life insurance plan and
that the agent fraudulently misrepresented that the new policy would
provide the same coverage as the company's old policy." In reviewing
the facts of that case, the Eleventh Circuit found that the conduct
alleged by the Farlows was "intertwined" with the refusal to pay
benefits." Thus, the court in Farlow held that the plaintiffs' claims
were preempted by ERISA." 0
In the present case, the Eleventh Circuit found that, like Farlow,
Morstein was claiming fraudulent misrepresentation by an insurance
agent. Next, the Eleventh Circuit stated they were bound by the
precedent set by the court in Farlow;thus, Morstein's state-law claims
were preempted by ERISA. °1 The court rejected Morstein's argument
that Hankins was acting as her agent and that Hankins and the Shaw
Agency were not each a "party in interest" and therefore not governed
by ERISA.1" The court stated that the important relationship was not
the one between the parties, but rather the one between the alleged
conduct and the refusal to pay benefits."° "If the actions of a party,
regardless of his 'interest' in the plan, are intertwined with the refusal
to pay benefits,
then the action is related to the plan, and thus, it is
°4
preempted."
At the end of the opinion, however, Circuit Judge Burch, who authored
the opinion, expressed concern about Eleventh Circuit law on this point.
Specifically, he stated "this case presents yet another example of an
employee left without a remedy because of ERISA's broad preemption." 1"'
In a special concurrence, Circuit Judge Goodwin also noted tension
between the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Farlow and the Fifth Circuit's

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

874 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1989).
Id at 794.
Id.
Id.
74 F.3d at 1137-38.

102. I&
103. Id. at 1138.
104. Id
105. Id. at 1138 n.3.
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holding in Perkins v. Time Insurance Co., ~ and claimed that there
was an intra-circuit conflict in Eleventh Circuit doctrine due to the
Eleventh Circuit's affirmance without opinion of Martin v. Pate.'1°
Judge Goodwin stated that "it may be timely and appropriate to suggest
an en banc review of the preemption matter.""l'
Only a few months after this opinion, the Eleventh Circuit revisited
this case and issued a new "en banc" opinion. In Morstein v. National
Insurance Services,"° the court reviewed ERISA legislative history and
Supreme Court case law regarding ERISA preemption. The court
focused on the Supreme Court's opinion in New York Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co."0 and found that
the broad guidance that the Court gave in analyzing state law was
helpful to the Eleventh Circuit's analysis of Morstein's claims."
In New York Conference, the Supreme Court specifically noted that
there would be limitations on the ERISA preemption doctrine:
The governing text of ERISA is clearly expansive ....Ifrelate to
were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then
for all practical purposes, preemption would never run its course, for
"[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere .... " But that, of course,

would be to read Congress' words of limitation as a mere sham, and to
read the presumption against preemption out of the law whenever

Congress speaks to the matter with generality. That said, we have to
the phrase relate to does
recognize that our prior attempt to construe 112

not give us much help drawing the line here.

The Supreme Court then cited the often quoted language in Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, Inc.," 3 which defined a law "relating to" an employee
benefit plan as one that "has a connection with or reference to such a
plan."" 4 Thus, because not every state law action had a true connection with such a plan, the Supreme Court found that several state law
claims would not be subject to preemption."
After reviewing this case law, the Eleventh Circuit went on to analyze
the facts of Morstein in more detail and determined that Morstein's true

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

898 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1990).
749 F. Supp. 242 (S.D. Ala. 1990), affd, 934 F.2d 1265 (11th Cir. 1991).
74 F.3d at 1140.
93 F.3d 715 (11th Cir. 1996).
115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
93 F.3d at 716.
115 S. Ct. at 1677 (citations omitted).
463 U.S. 85, 90 (1993).
115 S. Ct. at 1677.

115. Id.
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claim was being levied against the insurance agent and the insurance
agency. The court then noted that the insurance agent and insurance
agency-whom Morstein was suing were not ERISA entities.11 Specifically, ERISA entities are either the employer, the plan, the plan
fiduciaries, and/or the beneficiaries under the plan.117 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Morstein's state law claims against an
independent insurance agent and his agency for fraudulent inducement
to purchase certain coverage were not preempted by section 514(a) of
ERISA." ' In other words, the court found that this type of state law
claim did not have such a significant connection with the plan as to truly
"relate to" the plan." 9 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit reversed its earlier
decision and the district court's grant of summary judgment and
specifically overruled any earlier decisions that were contradictory to
this holding. 2°
C.

Statute of Limitations
In Musick v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,"' several employees filed
suit claiming that their layoff by defendant Goodyear was motivated by
its desire to deprive them of retirement benefits, in violation of ERISA.
In 1994, almost four years after Goodyear had laid the employees off,
plaintiffs first filed their suit alleging a wrongful motivation behind the
lay offs. The employees were seeking back pay, benefits, as well as
retirement eligibility credit, for the time they were laid off. The district
court determined that a two-year statute of limitations was applicable
to plaintiffs' lawsuit and dismissed their claim."
Plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and while conceding they
filed their lawsuit two years after the date of their lay offs, they
contended that a six-year statute of limitation governed section 510
ERISA actions in Alabama. The Eleventh Circuit noted that ERISA did
not contain a statute of limitations for section 510 actions and stated
"because Congress has not established a time limitation for such actions
'the settled practice has been to adopt a state time limitation as federal

116. 93 F.2d at 722.
117. Id. (citing Travitz v. Northeast Apartment, ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund, 13
F.3d 704, 706 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2165 (1994); Sommers Drug Stores &
Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1467 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034
(1987)).

118. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 81 F.3d 136 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 389 (1996).
122. 81 F.3d at 137.
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law.'"" The Eleventh Circuit explained that, when adopting a state
statute of limitations, a court needs to first determine the essential
nature of the claim and then focus on the period applicable to the claim
under the most analogous state law.'
In determining the most analogous state law, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that most federal courts try to look to the "character" of the case.
The Eleventh Circuit specifically stated that "characterization of the
essential nature of an ERISA action is a matter of federal law."12
While the Eleventh Circuit had characterized an ERISA section 510
had yet to make such a
claim in both Georgia and Florida, the circuit
126
characterization under Alabama state law.
After reviewing the Georgia and Florida cases already determined, the
Eleventh Circuit found that there were two provisions in Alabama law
that were closely analogous to section 510 actions: (1) the workers'
compensation statute of limitations addressing retaliatory discharge; and
(2) the statute of limitations governing recovery of wages. 127 In both
circumstances, the statute of limitations was two years from the day the
The court then found that Alabama's general sixaction accrued."
year statute of limitations, governing "actions upon any simple contract
or specialty not enumerated [specifically]," would not govern section 510
actions in Alabama because the two state law provisions involving wages
and retaliatory discharge "more narrowly and specifically contemplated
the [section 5101 action" before the court." Consequently, because the
two-year statute of limitation applied to section 510 ERISA actions in
Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of
summary judgment for defendants.'30
VI. CONCLUSION
As can be seen by a review of the cases cited above, the issues decided
by the Eleventh Circuit this past year demonstrate how specialized the
area of traditional labor law is becoming. Attorneys who practice in this
area of law need to familiarize themselves in detail with the applicable
federal statutes and continue to stay abreast of the Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation and rulings concerning these issues.
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1d (citing Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 1989)).
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